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Crime Place Networks in Las Vegas
A New Violence Reduction Strategy
Tamara D. Herold, PhD, Associate Professor, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and
Jamie Prosser, Captain, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Nevada

In 2017, the Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) adopted a
series of interventions designed to reduce gang and gun violence across Las Vegas.
In partnership with the International Association of Chiefs of Police/University of
Cincinnati (IACP/UC) Center for Police Research and Policy and with evaluation
funding provided by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, the LVMPD
implemented three violence reduction strategies: (1) focused deterrence (o ender
noti cation sessions); (2) hot spot patrols; and (3) place network investigations (PNI),
also known as place-based investigations of violent o ender territories (PIVOT),
which is the focus here.

Place Network Investigations
The PNI strategy is grounded in the assumption that crime is not random, and police
resources can be directed to disrupt crime concentrations.1 A large evidence base
con rms that crime concentrates across places, victims, and o enders. This evidence
has prompted police administrators to adopt focused policing strategies; for
example, hot spots policing in high-crime places, initiatives to protect high-risk

victims, and repeat o ender deterrence strategies. The importance of the placecrime connection, in particular, is widely acknowledged by both researchers and
practitioners. Early research reported that just 3 percent of addresses in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, accounted for 50 percent of calls for service in a given year,
and this nding has been replicated and supported by decades of subsequent
research reporting similar patterns of crime concentrations across multiple types of
places and units of analysis.2
Researchers and practitioners have had remarkable success in reducing violence by
employing focused deterrence strategies that disrupt o ender networks. Using
social network analysis, police identify and target speci c o enders for enhanced
deterrence e orts or incapacitation. Research evidence suggests that interventions
targeting o ender networks can lead to substantial reductions in violence across
cities.3 While police interventions targeting individual high-crime places can
signi cantly reduce incidents of crime at particular locations, recent theoretical
advances suggest that, like o enders, places might function together as part of a
larger network.4
A recent hypothesis proposed by those responsible for developing the PNI violence
reduction strategy is that crime place networks provide the “infrastructure” needed
to operate illicit markets.5 Locations that form crime place networks lack e ective
place management.6 Violent incidents result from o ender interactions that take
place at these unmanaged locations as they engage in activities related to the
operation of illicit markets (e.g., drug, weapon, or human tra cking).
While crime maps depict places where crime occurs, crime place networks include at
least three other types of locations used by o enders that do not always or regularly
come to the attention of police. Drawing from recent advances in crime place theory,
the PNI strategy attempts to uncover four types of places (known as CS4) that
constitute crime place networks:7
1. Crime Sites—speci c places where crime occurs
2. Convergent Settings—public places where o enders routinely meet
3. Comfort Spaces—private meeting, staging, and supplying locations
4. Corrupting Spots—places that encourage criminal activity in other locations

Given that police data re ect only places where crimes occur (i.e., crime sites), the
other three locations in crime place networks—convergent settings, comfort spaces,
and corrupting spots—often remain hidden and free of targeted police
investigations. Investigations and subsequent e orts to dismantle crime place
networks form the basis of the PNI strategy.

PNI Model Overview
First developed to address shooting and violent crime hot spots in Cincinnati, Ohio,
the PNI strategy follows the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment)
model of problem-solving to uncover and address crime place networks.8

Phase One: Scanning (Data Analyses)
In the rst phase, analyses are conducted to
determine how and where violence,
particularly gun violence, clusters across the
jurisdiction. In Cincinnati, analysis revealed
that more than 40 percent of all shooting
victims were shot within 23 geographically
small areas, called micro-locations. These
micro-locations spanned approximately two
square blocks and made up only 1.4 percent
of the city’s land mass. Further analysis
revealed that violent crime and o cer
injuries were also disproportionately
concentrated in these locations.9

Phase Two: Analysis (Investigation)

The second phase involves investigations of o ender and crime place networks.
O ender networks can be investigated and addressed through complementary
strategies (e.g., focused deterrence). To identify crime place networks, the PNI
strategy requires o cers use a wide variety of investigative techniques to uncover
o ender movement patterns and ownership or management practices in and
around known crime sites. For example, interviews with patrol o cers, detectives,
specialized units (e.g., violent crime, gang, vice, homicide), crime analysts, city and
county department personnel, community members, and service personnel (e.g.,
postal service workers) can identify crime place network locations, their owners, and
key players in the o ender networks who use these locations. To build civil and
criminal cases against place owners, managers, and serious o enders, investigations
might require observational activities (e.g., temporary surveillance cameras, site
observations, or undercover o cers), as well as the use of additional sources of
information (e.g., security personnel, management personnel, or labor contractors)
and con dential informants.

Phase 3: Response (Solutions)
Once locations within a crime place network are identi ed, the third phase involves
biweekly meetings with a citywide PNI Investigative Board. The PNI Investigative
Board consists of representatives from various city departments and community
organizations (e.g., re, tra c and engineering, buildings, health, treasury, parks and
recreation, public services, and community improvement organizations). Board
members hold leadership roles and can leverage resources within their respective
departments and organizations. Police investigators present their ndings to the
board, and members provide additional information about the identi ed locations
from their respective departments/agencies. The PNI Investigative Board can
dismantle the place network through various means, including using legal remedies
to revoke business licenses; requiring new management practices; mandating
employee training; ordering owners into court-mandated receivership; requiring
changes to the physical design of a building; or, ultimately, ordering complete
property abatement. The board can also prioritize city resources to more quickly

address crime-facilitating places (e.g., schedule building demolitions, reroute tra c
patterns, or initiate redevelopment projects) and disrupt crime place networks.
A coordinated all-city response provides
additional leverage, resources, and
intervention options to e ectively dismantle
deeply entrenched crime place networks—
the sources of persistent and chronic crime
hot spots. PNI interventions block crime
activities by changing the way in which places
are managed and used. Interventions might
involve altering parking restrictions or tra c
patterns along a road commonly used in drive-by shootings or seizing and
repurposing a corner store laundering money for a violent drug market. A focus on
place networks, rather than individual crime sites, roots out the larger infrastructure
o enders retreat to and then reemerge from once police resources are deployed
elsewhere.

Phase 4: Assessment (Monitoring)
Once the crime place network has been dismantled (i.e., opportunities for violence
have been blocked or place dynamics that facilitate violence have been altered at
identi ed locations), phase four begins. In phase four, crime levels continue to be
monitored, community resources are organized by the PNI Investigative Board or
other local community councils and organizations, and organic neighborhood-led
redevelopment can begin in the absence of persistently high levels of violence. This
redevelopment makes the reestablishment of crime place networks less likely with
the introduction of additional or more e ective management at nearby places.

PNI Similarities and Di erences to Other Approaches
The PNI violence reduction strategy is similar to other successful problem-focused
policing projects in at least three ways. First, PNI focuses attention on a speci c
problem (e.g., shootings) and calls for detailed analysis of place conditions that

facilitate similar harmful events.10 Second, PNI focuses attention on criminogenic
places. A vast body of evidence suggests that a small number of risky facilities or
individual crime generators and attractors account for the majority of crime in any
hot spot.11 Third, the PNI strategy also promotes “shifting and sharing of
responsibility” for solving crime problems.12 Place managers are held accountable
for harms that occur on their properties. Responsibility is also shifted to “supercontrollers” who control local government resources.13 Like most other successful
crime reduction initiatives, the success of PNI requires strong law enforcement
leadership and participation on the part of local government.14
However, the PNI strategy is also di erent from traditional policing strategies in at
least three ways. First, this is one of the rst place-based strategies to acknowledge
that violent micro-locations are dangerous places for police. In Cincinnati, o cer
injuries and suspect behaviors that led to o cer injuries (e.g., resisting arrest) were
disproportionately concentrated in the identi ed violent micro-locations. Thus,
persistently violent hot spots are risky for both residents and o cers who respond
to these locations. Second, PNI focuses on how places function as crime-facilitating
networks. Long-term crime reduction is achieved by dismantling the entire physical
infrastructure used by o enders, beyond places where crime occurs (crime sites).
Trained investigators uncover connected networks of o ender-used places that
cannot be identi ed through calls-for-service analysis alone. These places include
public and private locations used by o enders to plan and carry out crime
(convergent settings and comfort spaces), as well as businesses that facilitate crime
markets (corrupting spots). Third, PNI leverages all city resources to dismantle crime
place networks. Championed by the mayor or city manager, PNI investigators
regularly present their ndings to other city department managers (e.g.,
representatives from departments like tra c and engineering and buildings and
inspections) and the city solicitor, who can often be much better suited to design and
implementation of place-focused crime prevention interventions than police.
In Cincinnati, two PNI pilot sites experienced signi cant reductions in violence during
the rst year (over 89 percent in the rst site and 71 percent in the second site), and
the Cincinnati Police Department reports that violence remains historically low in
these areas more than three years after intervention. By 2017, the PNI strategy had
been implemented in three additional sites in Cincinnati. Analyses revealed that,

across all ve sites, the number of shooting victims declined by 72.46 percent over a
two-year period, with 69 shooting victims reported during the pre-evaluation 24month period and 19 shooting victims reported during the post-evaluation 24-month
period.15
Given Cincinnati’s initial promising results,
the LVMPD command sta elected to pilot
test the PNI strategy in a single location
and committed to assigning an
investigative unit to the project for a
minimum of 12 months. Command sta , in
consultation with Director of Crime
Analysis Patrick Baldwin, selected a project
site within the bureau’s Northeast Area
Command (NEAC) for PNI implementation. The site selected for the primary focus on
the intervention encompassed a speci c condominium complex, small strip mall that
housed a convenience store, and nearby multifamily unit housing. This site was
selected for the following four reasons:
1. The location was considered a persistent hot spot within the NEAC.
2. A gang shooting involving a 16-year-old recently occurred at the complex and
received considerable media and public attention.
3. The NEAC captain had strong relationships with internal and external partners
who could assist with the project, including the county commissioner.
4. Other social services projects being conducted in the area (e.g., Pathway from
Poverty) were seen as complementary to PNI objectives, and personnel
believed these resources could be leveraged to achieve long-term
sustainability in crime reductions.
The NEAC captain assigned her FLEX (Flexible Deployment) team to implement the
PNI strategy and serve as the primary investigative unit. The LVMPD PNI unit
consisted of a supervisory sergeant, with extensive investigative experience, and a
team of o cers. Typically, four to six o cers were assigned at any given time to the
unit. As personnel changes were made during the duration of the project, o cers

were selected based on their desire to gain investigatory experience and interest in
learning to conduct place network investigations. The PNI unit sergeant and his team
provided regular brie ngs to the NEAC captain.
Researchers from the IACP/UC Center
arranged to provide technical assistance and
training to LVMPD’s PNI investigative unit. An
introductory training for investigators and
internal and external partners (e.g., LVMPD’s
Special Investigations Section and Parole and
Probation) was conducted in April 2018. The
introductory training covered general placecrime principles and evidence supporting the
use of PNI, as well as examples of
investigation techniques and partnerships found to be e ective in addressing crimefacilitating dynamics at places. Ongoing training and assistance were provided on a
biweekly basis in the form of on-site meetings or telecommunication with strategy
experts and police personnel involved in Cincinnati Police Department’s PNI
implementation. This assistance provided the LVMPD PNI unit with information
regarding e ective place network investigatory tactics and evidence-based place
interventions associated with violent crime reduction.
Under the direction of Captain Nichole Splinter and, subsequently, Captain Jamie
Prosser, the LVMPD PNI unit uncovered the crime place network linked to the
targeted hot spot. Although project limitations did not permit the LVMPD to establish
a fully operational PNI Investigative Board, the investigative team and NEAC captains
regularly met with stakeholders to leverage additional resources.

Early PNI Results
A program review was conducted by the IACP/UC Center for Police Research and
Policy under the direction of the center’s director, Dr. Robin Engel. The review
documented the investigative and enforcement and compliance tactics used by the
LVMPD PNI unit at the pilot site. Although not exhaustive, this review identi ed four
general investigative and response activities:

■ surveillance and intelligence gathering
■ external agency coordination and partnership building
■ e ecting changes to physical locations and place management practices
■ enforcement actions
Numerous surveillance and intelligence gathering methods were used to uncover an
existing crime place network. Direct site observations were conducted through overt
and covert surveillance. Resident and business owner or manager interviews and
surveys were conducted throughout the project period. Sources of information (e.g.,
postal workers, security personnel) and con dential informants were used to gather
additional place-speci c intelligence. Calls placed by arrestees in detention facilities
and social media sites were monitored. Persons arrested in the PNI site were later
interviewed by investigators. Property and crime data records were analyzed to
identify place-o ender connections. Phone records and GPS monitoring were used
to analyze o enders’ movement patterns between locations. Intelligence bulletins
were created to facilitate information sharing between internal LVMPD personnel
and units.
Coordination with external agencies generated additional intelligence concerning
o enders and places in the PNI site. PNI investigators worked with the Gaming
Control Board, Business Licensing investigators, and other personnel to investigate
local business practices. Additional intelligence was gathered through meetings with
Internal Revenue Service investigators, Housing and Urban Development
representatives, the state attorney general’s o ce, and Nevada Real Estate Division
personnel. Coordination with a local constable led to resident education concerning
eviction rights to stem illegal eviction practices.
Physical and place management changes were made to alter dynamics in crime
place network locations. Additional cameras, license plate readers, additional
lighting, removal of business window obstructions, and new access controls were
added to network locations. In partnership with homeowners association (HOA)
representatives, PNI investigators assisted in making substantial changes to the
condominium bylaws. HOA bylaws were revised to require owners to provide
updated tenant information 10 days prior to move-in, and new regulations instituted
a $5,000 ne leveraged against owners of properties subjected to SWAT raids that
found evidence of illegal activities.

Enforcement action was taken against known
o enders, as well as businesses and property
owners or managers of places identi ed as
part of the crime place network. A case was
built and led against a problematic property
manager who facilitated illegal activities
across multiple housing units. Controlled
drug buys identi ed key o enders operating
in the area. Targeted arrests were made as a
result of operations with Parole and Probation. Businesses were cited and ned for
illegal practices. Surveillance operations with internal (e.g., Special Investigations
Section) and external (e.g., Gaming Control Board) partners led to citations for health
violations and illegal security practices.
The number of gun-related crime incidents documented during the treatment period
(May 1, 2018–April 30, 2019) were compared to the number of gun-related crime
incidents that occurred during the year prior to the intervention. The 12-month to
12-month comparison allowed the analysis to control for seasonal e ects. Postintervention changes in the number of crime incidents (a reduction of 39.1 percent in
the 12-month post-intervention period) suggest that the PNI strategy contributed to
a decrease in gun-related violent crime at the targeted site. Additional data provided
by PNI investigative personnel show that crime at the pilot site has continued to
decrease over time, with no gun-related violent crimes reported between midSeptember 2019 and the time at which this article was written (mid-March 2020).

Future Directions
While emergency crises such as pandemics, natural disasters, terrorism activities,
and other immediate threats may alter the focus of rst responders to meet
emerging needs, community violence has been and will remain a signi cant concern
both during and subsequent to these situations. With potentially fewer resources
available to address this issue, given the economic impact the COVD-19 pandemic
will likely have on local governments, it is imperative that law enforcement continue
to explore strategies that help agencies focus and prioritize existing resources.
Further, there is a pressing need to identify strategies that can produce long-term,
sustainable results. One such strategy could be PNI. Replication and future research

will be necessary to adequately assess the
strategy’s e ectiveness and impact on residents,
businesses, police agencies, local governments,
and the larger justice system.
Moving forward, agencies interested in adopting
the PNI strategy should consider the following
policy implications stemming from the LVMPD
PNI evaluation:
1. PNI, as implemented in Las Vegas, holds
promise for reducing gun-related crime
and improving community safety. PNI
investigative team activities appear to
have signi cantly altered place dynamics
to decrease violence, as evidenced by
available crime data, site observations,
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and discussions with property employees conducted by the research team.
2. To enhance PNI strategy e ectiveness, it is recommended that law
enforcement agencies wishing to adopt PNI establish a standing PNI
Investigative Board rst and gain the cooperation of local government o cials
to leverage necessary resources.
3. It will be necessary to implement the program across multiple sites for a
su cient period of time to fully assess the impact of the PNI strategy on gunrelated violent crime. Post-intervention assessment periods should be
designed to consider the lagged e ect of PNI strategy interventions. 
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